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Abstract 
 
For decades much effort has been made to im-
prove project management capabilities. Still, the 
failure rate remains high, especially for large IT 
projects. Our postmortem analysis of 15 large IT 
projects of the Swiss Federal Administration, with 
an accumulated loss of one billion U.S. dollars, 
shows that while project management deficits ac-
count for some of the failures, project failure is pri-
marily caused by poor project governance capabili-
ties. Based on insights gained from the initial failure 
analysis, the Swiss Federal Government decided to 
assess all its large IT projects based on our co-de-
signed framework. Meanwhile, also private compa-
nies have assessed IT projects applying our frame-
work. As a consequence, valuable discussions and 
measures have been initiated and sporadically pro-
jects were stopped. The data gained by these assess-
ments will allow to identify patterns that promise to 
be a reference for governance actors and bodies 
what information to ask for, when to intervene, and 
how. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Even after many decades of increasingly mature 
project management practice1, 71% of IT projects 
fail completely or partially [1]. In particular, large 
governmental IT projects (more than 6 million U.S. 
dollars labor cost) are affected, where the share of 
complete or partial failure reaches 87% [2]. Public 
sector IT projects are six times more likely to over-
run costs and twenty times more likely to overrun 
schedule than similar projects in the private sector 
[3]. In light of the increasing number of IT projects 
in the context of digitization in both sectors, it is to 
be expected that failure costs of IT projects are going 
to increase even more. 
Albeit years of broad attention to IT project suc-
cess in both IT and project management academia 
                                                     
1
 There is a high number of professional project management ed-
ucation programs accompanied by a high demand for practition-
ers with project management certifications [36]  
and practice, there remain uncertainty, conflicts and 
a thirst for knowledge about project success and fail-
ure factors. One way towards increasing project suc-
cess in the future is understanding project failures 
through retrospective analyses. Such analyses not 
only help to identify the mistakes made, but also pre-
vent future missteps [4]. 
For this reason it came as no surprise as four 
years ago public pressure and disclosure urged the 
investigation of failed IT projects within the Swiss 
Federal Administration, which caused a loss amount 
of ca. one billion U.S. dollars. This need for an in-
depth postmortem analysis has led to our oppor-
tunity to not only co-design an analysis framework, 
but also to apply it to 15 large, complex, failed IT 
projects within the Swiss Federal Offices.  
The somewhat paradox situation of continuously 
maturing project management techniques and capa-
bilities, accompanied by the prevailing project fail-
ures, triggered the expansion of our focus beyond 
project management, leading to our research ques-
tion: “Why do IT projects fail even if project man-
agement was carried out according to the state-of-
the-art?”  
 
2. Background  
 
To underpin the elements of our analysis frame-
work, we briefly summarize our understanding of 
both project success and project failure, and define 
project governance. These concepts are concerned 
with not only the conformity of project management 
with the interest of the owner and organization [5, 
6], but also with the performance of the project 
(management) within the organization [7, 8]. 
 
2.1. Understanding Project Success and 
Project Failure  
 
For decades there has been an extensive discus-
sion on how to define project success (and failure) 
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and its causes. Many publications use the tripartite 
definition of success - on time, within a set budget, 
and a requested functionality – often referred to as 
the iron triangle. However, the concept of the iron 
triangle has been challenged [9, 10] and a broad 
agreement on how to define project success has not 
yet been reached. Baccarini [11] split the concept of 
project success into a process and a product compo-
nent. Process success is oriented at the iron triangle 
criteria where “[…] failure is seldom a result of 
chance. Instead it is rooted in one, or a series of mis-
step(s) by project managers” [12, p. 70]. Product 
success, on the other hand, measures the project out-
come in terms of user satisfaction and / or realized 
user benefit. Hence, even if project management has 
been successful, the final outcome of the project 
may not fulfil essential stakeholder requirements. As 
a consequence, it is often suggested to add a benefit 
component to the concept of the iron triangle or even 
to shift the emphasis from process to product perfor-
mance: Project goals should shift from successful 
deployment (i.e. doing solution development right) 
to benefit realization in use (i.e. developing the right 
solutions) [10, 13]. Considering the context (i.e. so-
cial, organizational, political, and technological en-
vironments or conditions) becomes essential to de-
livering a successful project. The context has been 
identified as critical not only for IT projects, but also 
for other types of projects [14, 15, 16, 17]. In con-
clusion, we understand a successful project as not 
only being on time, within a set budget, and meeting 
requested functionality through a successful project 
management process, but also as creating an out-
come / product that is being used within a given con-
text. Therefore, we argue that the key to project suc-
cess often lies beyond project management. 
 
2.2. Doing Things Right vs. Doing the Right 
Things 
 
Massive organizational investments, but also in-
creasingly mature methods and certifications have 
led to a large and highly skilled workforce and pool 
of experts in the field of project management, which 
clearly helped to scale up the amount of successfully 
completed projects. Method support ranges from ge-
neric project management methods to those that are 
specific to agile development (e.g., PRINCE2 Agile 
[18]), to large IT projects (e.g., HERMES [19]), or 
even very large infrastructure projects (e.g., S-O-S 
Method [20]). What all of these project management 
                                                     
2
 As HERMES is the reference project management method in 
our analysis. There are some details given here: HERMES is a 
project management method for IT projects, which has been ex-
panded to guiding service and product development, and business 
adjustment projects. The method was developed by the Swiss 
Federal Administration and is available as an open standard. Be-
methods have in common is their focus on doing 
things right. Project management is understood as 
“[…]the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and 
techniques to project activities to meet project re-
quirements” [21, p. 15] by project managers. How-
ever, as mentioned before, project success does not 
solely lie in the hands of the project manager and her 
team, because projects are embedded not only in an 
organizational, but also in a specific context (e.g., 
organizational, technical, political). Hence, if certain 
conditions are given – no matter all efforts taken for 
bringing project management to perfection – pro-
jects are doomed to failure. The actions of project 
management depend on decisions made on the pro-
ject governance level: doing the right thing lays the 
foundation for doing things right.  
 Project governance only recently started to gain 
increasing attention in academia and practice. It is 
concerned with the alignment of project objectives 
with the organizational context and strategy [21] and 
constitutes the framework for project decisions [22]. 
Actors and bodies on the project governance level 
are the project sponsor and a steering committee (of 
which the project sponsor is a member) who set the 
framework and boundaries for project management 
(i.e. through definition of policies, processes and 
roles) and at the same time support project managers 
in managing the project successfully - i.e. meeting a 
project’s objective [23, 24]. Figure 1 shows project 
governance and management in hierarchical struc-
ture as it is understood in HERMES2 [19]: 
 
 
	

 
Linking the business organization’s management 
and governance level with the project organization, 
project sponsors have a critical role regarding the 
performance of large, complex projects [8, 25]. The 
sides the federal administration, which is obligated to use HER-
MES to manage its IT projects, many other public sector organi-
zations and administrations, as well private sector companies 
have successfully work with HERMES. There are also HERMES 
educational courses and certifications. To find more information 
please go to: https://www.isb.admin.ch/isb/en/home/themen/pro-
jektmanagement/hermes.html  
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project sponsor and the steering committee represent 
the business organization with its strategy, vision 
and goals in the project, allocate resources, and first 
and foremost are responsible that the right things are 
done. Doing the right thing can also mean cancelling 
a project. For example, if there are changes in the 
business environment that have an influence on re-
quirements and scope, cancelling even an on-track 
project that however sooner or later will be im-
pacted, might actually be the best decision [26]. 
Once started, complex projects – like most IT pro-
jects – are difficult to control and “the tendency to 
cover up and deny early indications of project trou-
bles compounds the problems and delays their reso-
lution” [27, p. 69]. In the worst case - when poor 
contextual conditions are denied - it is almost impos-
sible to prevent a project from failing [28]. 
An increasing yet small number of organizations 
and governmental institutions have introduced gov-
ernance frameworks. Despite the relevance of pro-
ject governance for project success, there is a lack of 
research on the roles and processes of project gov-
ernance [29]. Furthermore, not many practical gov-
ernance guidelines and methods exist for projects - 
and those are rarely applied or certified [30] [31]. 
Whereas in most organizations project managers 
have to bring along the required skills and corre-
sponding certificates for managing a project, project 
sponsors or steering board members often just slip 
into their role because of their (hierarchical) position 
in the organization or their management experience 
[32].  The high maturity of project management, to-
gether with the comparatively low maturity of pro-
ject governance, constitute the backdrop for the fail-
ure analysis presented in the next section. 
 
3. Failure Analysis through a Co-De-
signed Framework  
 
Public pressure and disclosure has formed our 
opportunity to analyze 15 large, complex failed IT 
projects of the Swiss Federal Administration. The 
study was commissioned to answer the question 
why, despite the application of a state-of-the art pro-
ject management method, these projects failed and 
created losses of together approximately one billion 
U.S. dollars in a period of less than 10 years – quite 
a significant amount for a country with only around 
8 million inhabitants. As it should be a key objective 
of every postmortem analysis to investigate not only 
what went wrong and what went right, but also “[…] 
make recommendations that might help future pro-
ject managers avoid ending up in a similar position” 
                                                     
3
 The Swiss Parliament consists of two chambers: Swiss National 
Council and in the Swiss Council of States. 
[12, p. 70], we focused on discovering failure pat-
terns to derive specific, employable measures to 
limit the damage of current, shaky projects and en-
sure the success of future endeavors. In line with 
Nelson’s [4] emphasis on retrospectives as not being 
limited to the post-implementation phase of a pro-
ject, another objective was to design an analysis in-
strument that is also applicable and useful for as-
sessing ongoing projects, hoping that failures can be 
prevented, present practices improved or changed, 
and future losses avoided. Thus, our instrument was 
co-designed with public administration offices that 
have an interest in applying such an instrument not 
only for postmortem analysis, but also in ex ante 
evaluation or project controlling. 
 
3.1. Studied Projects 
 
The 15 studied projects are all large and complex 
governmental IT projects that have been declared as 
failed by the Federal Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) - not meeting budget, functionality and / or 
time targets, and / or not generating promised value 
to the stakeholders. The projects were conducted in 
different federal departments and therefore embed-
ded in different environments.  
Due to the gravity of failure and public rele-
vance, some of the cases were subject to debate in 
the Swiss Parliament3 as well as to reports of federal 
Investigation Commissions and even entailed legal 
lawsuits. Thus, many of the cases have gained broad 
media and public attention. The encountered dam-
age consisted not only of financial losses, but also 
non-monetary losses like discontentment and loss of 
confidence from the general public and the parlia-
ment towards federal offices’ performance as every 
financial loss is squandered taxpayer’s money after 
all. All projects had different backgrounds and set-
tings due to their various origins and they all took 
quite different courses. However, they had in com-
mon that project management was based on HER-
MES [19], the project management method pre-
scribed for all projects of this size. Some projects ap-
plied agile procedures, but only for software devel-
opment purposes. The smallest project in our analy-
sis caused costs of about one million U.S. dollars 
and the largest around 750 million U.S. dollars (av-
erage approx. 85 million U.S. dollars, median ap-
prox. 11 million U.S. dollars). In the following, four 
exemplary projects from our sample are character-
ized. 
 
Project A 
This project was initiated by the Swiss Federal 
Tax Administration 2001 with the aim to unify and 
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replace the existing separately run financial services 
tax and general value added tax (VAT) information 
systems by a unified single system focusing on cus-
tomer processes. Troubles in procurement and dis-
putes between the administration office and the sup-
plier culminated in a cancellation of the contract in 
2006, followed by a disassembly of the original pro-
ject into many smaller projects with different spon-
sors. In subsequent years the projects had gotten out 
of hand financially so that the entire project bundle 
was cancelled in 2012. Until that time more than 120 
million U.S. dollars had been lost. One year later a 
follow-up project was launched. 
 
Project B 
In 2004 the Swiss Federal Roads Office launched 
an IT project to build a central data management sys-
tem to enable administrative bodies from federal to 
municipal level to manage all road and traffic data 
more efficiently and effectively. Because of lacking 
transparency within procurement processes, the vio-
lation of the Federal Budget Act, and changing re-
sponsibilities of the Swiss Federal Street Admin-
istration due to the passing of a new legislation that 
changed the requirements during the project, costs 
more than double of the initially budgeted 46 million 
U.S. dollars had accumulated when the project was 
stopped. 
 
Project C 
The aim of this project was the development of 
an e-government, e-voting and tracking solution, de-
signed for the special needs of a federal political sys-
tem. The original budget at the project launch in 
2003 was 1.3 million U.S. dollars per year over four 
years. In the end costs ran up to 19 million U.S. dol-
lars and were largely covered by the running budget 
of the accountable administration office. There were 
also preliminary investments of around 3 million 
U.S. dollars. Due to fundamental changes regarding 
e-government services, the main purpose of the pro-
ject became widely redundant. However, the project 
was terminated only upon political interpellations. 
Project D 
This Project was initiated by the Federal Office 
of Information Technology, Systems and Telecom-
munication of the Federal Department of Finance 
and targeted at the introduction of an electronic 
standard workspace for all employees of the federal 
administration. The original budget was 85 million 
U.S. dollars over 5 years. After planned costs rose 
up to more than 225 million U.S. dollars the project 
was suspended. In the end, the project boasted effec-
tive costs of 177 million U.S. dollars and a duration 
of 6 years. 
 
3.2. Co-Designing an Analysis Framework 
 
The co-design of our analysis framework was an 
iterative process: Our first aim was to understand the 
15 study projects. Thus, we started with the exami-
nation of the 15 projects through an analysis of pro-
ject documents. We had access to unlimited and ex-
tensive documentation, such as project proposals, 
project plans, phase reports, controlling reports, doc-
uments expressing internal and external expertise, 
protocols of steering committee and project manage-
ment meetings, project evaluations, and final re-
ports. In order to further deepen our insights we con-
ducted interviews with exponents of the largest pro-
jects under investigation. As we understood that due 
	

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to the (still) ongoing debate, which is far from cul-
minating into clearly defined concepts, we might not 
come to a to-the-point analysis framework by our-
selves we started to work with focus groups4. We ran 
focus groups consisting of eleven highly experi-
enced practitioners with several years of leadership 
and management experience in large, complex pro-
jects within the federal administration5. 
The main outcomes of the co-design phase are an 
analysis model, two structured questionnaires, a pro-
ject classification, and a set of failure patterns. 
Our project analysis model consists of two dimen-
sions: Project Method Compliance and Project Con-
text Assessment (see Figure 2)6. 
 
For each dimension we developed a structured  
questionnaire that covers 37 and 22 items, respec-
tively7. The items are assessed using individual qual-
itative scales (0-5) - e.g. in terms of project goals the 
scale ranges from “no formally defined project goals 
(in written form) that are clear to the involved per-
sons” (0) to “formally defined project goals (in writ-
ten form) that are mutually derived as well as thor-
oughly understood and explicitly accepted by every 
involved person” (6). The single scores of the single 
items of both the project management compliance 
analysis and project context assessment are consoli-
dated into an overall score for each management 
topic resp. context area and finally into an overall 
score for each studied project.  
 
Dimension 1: Project Method Compliance 
Our initial focus was on examining whether 
things had been done right. Thus, the goal was to as-
sess the project method compliance of each project 
in accordance with HERMES project management 
method as a reference (see Table 1). The single items 
represent capabilities and activities within a project 
that can be influenced by the project organization. 
Each of the eight jointly defined topics consists of 
several items that are closely related. 
	

Topic Items 
Project Goals Intention of sponsor; Goals per sub-
project, Management support for the 
project; Expectation management; 
Strategic conformity of the project 
Business Case Proven value (impact of the solu-
tion); Position of project in portfolio; 
Selection of project collaborators 
                                                     
 
4
 The use of focus groups is a suitable technique for “looking for 
the range of ideas […] that people have about something”, for 
“trying to understand differences in perspectives”, for getting 
“ideas to emerge from the group” and for looking for information 
and opinion in order to design a research study [34, p. 19, 35]. 
5
 Please see Appendix for more details about the co-designing of 
the analysis framework. 
Project Steer-
ing 
Personnel composition; Responsibil-
ity and accountability (duties and 
rules); Monitoring and preventive 
measures; Approval of phase transi-
tion 
Project Man-
agement 
Project brief; Project planning and 
management; Change management; 
Risk handling; Resource Manage-
ment;  Solution implementation; 
Project controlling; Reserves 
Business In-
volvement 
Process management; Organiza-
tional change management; Fund-
ing; Investment controlling; Enter-
prise architecture; Data management 
IT Involve-
ment 
Solution architecture; mastering 
technology; Availability of IT per-
sonnel; Operations and support 
Sourcing Fundamental decision making; Re-
quirements management; Procure-
ment processes 
Continuous 
Learning 
Experience transfer ex ante/post; 
Documentation of experience 
	
 
Area Items 
Terrain Experience with similar projects and 
solutions; Experience with infra-
structure, technology and manage-
ment; Cultural terrain 
Dynamics Technological progress; Organiza-
tional changes; Openness to change; 
Requirements to be met by the solu-
tion; Political environment; Legal 
framework 
System Com-
plexity 
Peripheral technical systems to be 
taken into account 
Organiza-
tional Com-
plexity 
Heterogeneity of stakeholders; Com-
plexity of organization 
General Com-
mitment 
Managerial commitment or attitude 
towards collaboration of business 
organization and project organiza-
tion; Coordination of budget and 
project situation 
General Abil-
ity to Act 
Decision-making autonomy within a 
project; assertiveness of project or-
ganization towards line organiza-
tion; project capabilities in business 
organization 
 
4. Results of the Failure Analysis 
 
During our analysis, we found that some of the 
projects have obviously failed due to the lack of ap-
propriate project management. However, we also 
6
 Further explanations on the results in each dimension will fol-
low in the next section (“Results of the Failure Analysis”) 
7
 The questionnaires (questions only) can be found here: 
https://begsolutions.com/BQMBEG/Downloadwith-
link.aspx?DocumentLinkID=280795a1-c1b3-466f-b22d-
f33bd6181fa0 
Page 6392
found projects with professional and skilled project 
teams and state-of-the-art project management that 
nevertheless ran into massive difficulties and failed. 
We created three groups of projects according to 
their project method compliance: good, medium and 
weak (see Figure 3 - respective sets of projects / col-
umns are colored green, yellow, and red). 
For projects P6, P14, P5, P1 and P9 a weak pro-
ject management was the major cause for project 
failure, which comes without surprise. For projects 
P8, P12, P3, P11, P10 and P4 we assessed some as-
pects of project management to be appropriate. 
However, the score for the project method compli-
ance was overall medium. Projects P13, P7, P15 and 
P2 were found having flawless project management, 
while still failing, which comes as a surprise. 
Four out of fifteen analyzed projects scored well 
regarding project management compliance. The rea-
son these projects nevertheless failed is to be found 
beyond the sphere of influence and power of the pro-
ject organization. Rather, the failure is caused by the 
project’s context. Our project context assessment 
showed that almost all projects had difficulties in re-
gards to general commitment and general ability to 
act (see Figure 4). 
 
 
	
 
 
!	
"  
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In many cases project managers and sometimes even 
other organizational actors were aware that the pro-
ject was not progressing in a satisfactory way. How-
ever, they did not have the necessary means or 
power to get their concerns adequately addressed by 
their steering committees. In addition to that, in 
some cases the necessary support and / or under-
standing for the project in the business organization 
was inadequate.
The combination of project method compliance 
scores (dimension 1 of our analysis model) with pro-
ject context assessment scores (dimension 2 of our 
analysis model) for each project allowed us to derive 
patterns that led to the following insights (see figure 
5):  
   
Finding #1 (Cluster I): Even good project manage-
ment cannot save a mission impossible 
All projects that had good scores regarding the 
project management, but nevertheless failed, faced 
difficult (pre-)conditions in regard of terrain or dy-
namics. These difficult (pre-) conditions could obvi-
ously not be compensated by good project manage-
ment alone (i.e. doing things right), particularly in 
combination with difficult conditions regarding gen-
eral commitment and general ability to act. 
 
Finding #2 (Cluster II): Even in known terrain ac-
companied by low dynamics, complexity endangers 
the mission if not countered by good project man-
agement  
Projects that had a medium management score 
(i.e. had done most things right) or weak manage-
ment score (i.e. were not adequately managed), even 
in known terrain and without dynamics challenges 
failed due to high organizational and / or technolog-
ical complexity. 
 
Finding #3 (Cluster III): In known terrain and low 
dynamics, complexity can be “healed” by good pro-
ject management  
Among the analyzed cases we did not find a sin-
gle well-managed project that only failed due to dif-
ficulties regarding IT complexity and / or organiza-
tional complexity. Our third finding is therefore that 
complexity alone – as long as it is the only contex-
tual challenge – can be compensated by proper pro-
ject management especially in known terrain and 
low dynamics. 
 
5. Proposed Countermeasures 
 
The analysis phase yielded the conclusion that 
there is a need for actively taking care of a project’s 
context. As a project’s context is beyond the scope 
of project management, this is a governance task and 
leadership is necessary in order to understand terrain 
as well as dynamics and handle complexity so that 
project missions are defined in a way that gives pro-
ject management a good chance to succeed. No mat-
ter how mature project management is, a project 
should not be started with a too high amount of tasks 
in new terrain and / or high dynamics.  
Based on our detail analysis, we proposed four-
teen measures. All measures were evaluated regard-
ing their relevance and feasibility in a workshop. 
The 40 participants formally represented all federal 
#	

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departments and agencies. The proposed measures 
were also cross-verified through interviews with ex-
ponents of four studied projects. Out of the fourteen 
proposed measures, twelve were rated as (very or 
fairly) relevant and (very or fairly) feasible and bun-
dled into three measure packages (see Table 3). 
These three measure packages are currently 
“translated” into respective extensions of the HER-
MES project management method or into supple-
mentary material (like guidelines to steering com-
mittees) within the Swiss Federal Administration8. 
	
$
Measure 
Package 
Measures 
“Founda-
tion”: 
Setting the 
foundation of 
a successful 
project organi-
zation for 
large, complex 
endeavors 
Establishing and upgrading 
project management as a rec-
ognized discipline within the 
organization; Establishing a 
professional project govern-
ance (i.e. project sponsors and 
steering committees assuming 
their responsibilities); Syn-
chronizing budgeting and 
sourcing activities of project 
with business organization; 
Strengthening sourcing strat-
egy and management 
“Triage”: 
Only launch-
ing large, 
complex pro-
jects within 
good context 
and with capa-
ble manage-
ment 
Implementing a “filter” (i.e. go 
/ no go) within a preliminary 
phase before a project’s ap-
proval focusing on context and 
project management method; 
Establishing a more structured 
and rigorous pre-project phase; 
Ensuring consistent monitoring 
regarding context and manage-
ment along all project phases 
“Ability”: 
Building the 
capabilities of 
successful, 
context-sensi-
tive project 
management 
and govern-
ance 
Building an organization wide 
project manager pool; Estab-
lishing  communities of prac-
tice to exchange project gov-
ernance and management ex-
perience; Employing internal 
and external experts and 
coaches to evaluate and sup-
port project managers, spon-
sors, and steering committees; 
Emphasizing the building of 
effective requirements and 
change management capacities 
                                                     
8
 Find more about the integration of the measure packages to 
HERMES (in German): https://www.newsd.ad-
min.ch/newsd/message/attachments/37501.pdf 
9
 KEY stands for key factors for project success. 
10
 This figure comprises of the 15 initial assessments of failed 
projects within the Swiss Federal Administration, ca. 100 subse-
The measure packages can not only be integrated 
into HERMES or project structures and organiza-
tions that use this project management method, they 
can also be useful to organizations and projects with 
other plan-driven project methods to trigger discus-
sions and improve their practice. 
 
6. Contribution to Practice 
 
Based on our initial study, the Swiss Federal 
Government decided that all ongoing large IT pro-
jects (> 5 million U.S. dollars) had to be assessed 
using our analysis model. In order to facilitate these 
ca. 100 assessments, we developed a web-based tool 
(KEY Tool9) and trained assessors. All assessments 
were done by the respective project teams and mod-
erated by trained assessors. Our assessments are usu-
ally organized as workshops (up to 4 hours) attended 
by the project sponsor, the project manager as well 
as other relevant project participants (up to 8 peo-
ple). Guided by the assessors, participants go 
through a maturity rating (incl. target/actual compar-
ison) of about 59 items regarding project context and 
project method compliance and have to reach a con-
sensus on each item.  
A (small) number of projects were stopped as a 
consequence of the assessment. For other projects, 
valuable discussions and measures were triggered by 
the assessment. 
In the meantime the KEY tool has also been de-
ployed to assess large and complex running IT pro-
jects within the private sector. The assessment 
(workshop) has been recognized as a valuable 
method to find potentials for improvement within a 
project by all participants. We have been continu-
ously evaluating and refining our tool. It can now be 
configured (i.e. individual selection of relevant 
questions, changing of wording of questions, etc.) to 
ensure an even better match with the project, the ap-
plied project method, and user benefit. 
The data gained by meanwhile close to 20010 as-
sessments allows us to continue with the identifica-
tion of patterns that promise to be a reference for 
steering committees and project sponsors about what 
information to ask for, when to intervene, and how 
to intervene. Furthermore, we are establishing a sys-
tematic monitoring of taken measures and their ef-
fect on the project’s course. For practitioners, in-
sights and patterns may be directly used to challenge 
actual business practices, including how steering 
committee members are prepared and supported in 
their organizations. Moreover, identifying patterns 
quent assessments of ongoing projects in the Swiss Federal Ad-
ministration, and ca. 75 assessments of ongoing projects in the 
public and private sector. 
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can leverage organizational learning regarding large, 
complex projects and thus contribute to future pro-
ject success. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Despite the general lack of consensus about project 
success and failure causes we were able to co-design 
an analysis framework through which we initially 
assessed 15 large, complex IT projects (that have 
failed) regarding their project management capabil-
ity (management components) and aspects “beyond 
project management” (i.e., contextual factors). In or-
der to reduce a project’s risk of failure, or rather, en-
sure its future success, its context has to be under-
stood better, monitored more closely, and changed 
more effectively. These activities are located on the 
level of project governance, not of project manage-
ment. Besides continuously fostering project man-
agement excellence, organizations therefore should 
focus on strengthening their project governance by 
developing and maintaining stable governance 
structures, effective processes and ensuring that 
roles are known and lived correctly. We suggest 
steering committees and project sponsors to deal 
with contextual factors (dimension 2 of our analysis 
model) as rigorously as they are used to deal with 
management components (dimension 1). Thus, 
steering committees should establish the analysis of 
project context as well as the systematic collection 
and re-use of decision making patterns as standard 
agenda items. Furthermore, structures and processes 
that allow an open dialogue between project man-
agement and steering level, need to be established to 
ensure an effective discourse on a project’s continu-
ously changing context. Our co-designed framework 
has allowed public and private organizations to ana-
lyze failed or running projects from a holistic per-
spective and to derive specific governance mea-
sures. 
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Methodological Appendix 
 
The goal of the first round of focus group meet-
ings was to narrow down the broad range of success 
and failure factors and aligning them with the pre-
scribed management method HERMES. The out-
come was a generally applicable structured ques-
tionnaire with questions, relevant for the analysis of 
the projects 
 Before the questionnaire was applied to all study 
projects, it had been evaluated and finalized in a 
joint workshop with the Federal CIO Office (prior to 
the investigation neither the Federal CIO nor mem-
bers of his office had an active role in any of the an-
alyzed projects). The final structured questionnaire 
addressed eight different management areas and also 
contained a form to record general information 
(characteristics) about the project. The eight areas 
(i.e. project goal, business case, project steering, 
project management, business involvement, IT in-
volvement, sourcing and continuous learning) were 
determined based on the standardized project man-
agement method HERMES, which had been applied 
in every studied project. 
After analyzing all cases on the basis of our ques-
tionnaire (every item rated between 0-5) we consol-
idated the results of the items and rated every area in 
the questionnaire with either positive, rather posi-
tive, rather negative or negative. 
In a second round of focus group meetings we 
clustered the cases regarding their context in order 
to make the project’s context comparable and to 
eventually identifying patterns. We then mutually 
derived six contextual factors (i.e. terrain, dynamics, 
system complexity, organizational complexity, gen-
eral commitment, and general ability to act) distin-
guishing the context of the projects. Thereafter a 
structured questionnaire was developed and applied 
to assess the contextual exposure of all 15 projects. 
Each contextual area was rated as supportive, neutral 
or adverse. 
In the end all findings were discussed and re-
evaluated by the focus groups and finally presented 
to members of the Federal CIO Office, where we 
found mutual agreement about the results and the ap-
plicability of our co-designed framework. 
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